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ABSTRACT 
On 19 December 2005 the recommendations of the Lockhart Review were 
released. One of the key recommendations was that current laws be amended to 
permit the creation of embryonic stem cells by somatic cell nuclear transfer. The 
Lockhart Report analysed the ethical arguments for and against the creation of 
embryos by nuclear transfer. It rationalised that, although there were various 
objections to such technology from some sections of Australian society, the good 
that this science has the potential to produce in the form of stem cell therapies to 
assist with or cure disease should prevail. This article will critically analyse the 
ethical arguments presented to the Lockhart Review and assess how the Review 
Committee resolved the debate as to the ethical status of a preimplantation 
embryo. It will be contended that the recommendations for reform should be fully 
implemented by the Federal Government, to enable scientists to have full access 
to both embryonic and adult stem cells, including custom-made stem cell lines 
created through the SCNT process, to allow medical research to progress to its 
fullest potential. 
 
Introduction 
In 2005 a Commonwealth Legislation Review Committee, termed the ‘Lockhart 
Review’, was appointed by the Minister For Ageing to undertake an independent 
review of the legislation regulating human embryo research, the Research Involving 
Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth) and Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth).1 
The Lockhart Review conducted an extensive consultation process, considering 1035 
written submissions and hearing oral evidence from 109 people across Australia.2  
The key recommendation of the Lockhart Report which has captured the 
attention of politicians, interests groups and the media is the call to amend current 
laws to permit somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), also referred to as ‘therapeutic 
cloning’. This process is currently legal in other countries such as the United 
Kingdom, South Korea and Singapore. It is also occurring in countries where there 
is no national regulation, such as the United States.3 The terms of reference of the 
Lockhart Review did not include an analysis of the ethical debate surrounding 
embryo research, as it was considered that these issues had been fully aired when 
the original Commonwealth legislation was enacted. However, a reading of many of 
the submissions made to the Committee, reveals that the ethics of the creation and 
destruction of human embryos for research purposes was a common theme. It is 
also clear that in the post-Review analysis of the recommendations, which will 
become of increasing relevance leading up to the introduction of amended 
legislation, this discussion has been reignited.  
This article will examine the Lockhart recommendation that SCNT and related 
practices be permitted in Australia. In examining this issue, the ethical concerns 
surrounding destructive embryo research will be critically analysed. Some 
commentators are of the view that preimplantation embryos are human life or at 
least, potential life, and as such should be accorded the rights that all persons are 
entitled to, including the right to life and bodily integrity.4 Others would argue that 
such entities are a primitive collection of cells that can provide valuable research 
tools, with the long term potential to alleviate the suffering of many Australians 
affected by serious diseases.5 To reconcile these competing views, an analysis of the 
ethical status of a preimplantation embryo will be undertaken. This assessment will 
be informed by some of the key submissions made to the Lockhart Review, and the 
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conclusions made by the Committee, which provide both current and valuable 
insights. After conducting this analysis, it will be suggested that the 
recommendations of the Lockhart Report should be fully implemented as they will 
ensure that medical research can progress to its fullest potential.  
 
The current laws relating to embryo research 
Currently in Australia, the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) 
provides that it is illegal to create a human embryo other than by fertilisation of a 
human egg by human sperm 6  and for any purpose other than for achieving 
pregnancy in a woman.7 Scientists are therefore not currently permitted to create 
human embryos known as ‘human embryo clones’ by the process somatic cell 
nuclear transfer (‘SCNT’), also referred to as ‘therapeutic cloning’.8 The legislation 
further outlaws the creation of human-animal hybrids or chimeric embryos, 
embryos with the genetic material of more than two people and embryos with genetic 
alterations.9 If such an embryo entity is created illegally, it is unlawful to implant it 
into the uterus of a woman, a practice referred to as ‘reproductive cloning’.10 It is 
also illegal to develop such an embryo in vitro for a period of more than fourteen 
days.11  
The only human embryos which are currently permitted to be used in 
biomedical research are excess ART embryos, that is, embryos which have been 
created in vitro to achieve pregnancy in a woman, but which are no longer required 
by the creating couple for reproductive purposes. 12  Previously only excess ART 
embryos created prior to 5 April 2002 could become the subject of biomedical 
research. 13  However, the provisions containing this time restriction were 
automatically repealed on 5 April 2005.14  
 
Embryos can only be donated to research when the creating couple have 
provided informed consent.15 Excess ART embryos have been considered to be less 
ethically controversial as they are already in existence and will be disposed of at the 
end of the permissible storage period, unless the creating couple donate them to 
research or to another infertile couple.16
As an indication of how the process of SCNT, if made legal, may be controlled, 
research involving excess ART embryos is currently tightly regulated by both 
Commonwealth and State legislation and by ethical guidelines.17 In order for an 
organisation to conduct destructive research on excess human embryos, it must 
obtain a licence from the Embryo Research Licensing Committee of the NHMRC.18 
There is a two-step process that must be followed. Firstly the research team must 
obtain the approval of the relevant institutional human research ethics committee 
(HREC). In considering the application, the HREC must ensure that the research 
project adheres to the guidelines set out in the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research Involving Humans.19  Subsequently, the research team must 
forward the HREC approval to the NHMRC Research Licensing Committee, which is 
then in a position to consider their application.  
The Licensing Committee must consider the HREC assessment along with the 
relevant NHMRC guidelines such as the Ethical guidelines on assisted reproductive 
technology.20 The legislation then requires the Licensing Committee to balance two 
requirements of the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth) in deciding 
whether to grant a license. The first requirement is the need to restrict the number 
of excess ART embryos to the minimum number likely to achieve the goals of the 
research project. 21  The second is that the proposed research must be likely to 
contribute to a significant advance in knowledge or improvement in technologies for 
treatment, which could not reasonably be achieved by other means.22
 
The relevant recommendations of the Lockhart Review Report  
The Lockhart Review Report recommends sweeping reform of the current 
legislative regime which would bring Australia into line with other countries such as 
the United Kingdom, which has permitted the creation of embryos via SCNT since 
2001.23  
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The Review Committee acknowledged the concerns of various sectors of 
Australian society in relation to the creation of human embryos for research 
purposes, however, it identified that the primary concern was that legalisation of the 
creation of embryos by nuclear transfer would lead to reproductive cloning. It noted 
that reproductive cloning of humans ‘is considered unacceptable throughout the 
world because of the ethical concerns about the social and psychological 
implications of creating a copy of a living or dead person, and safety issues 
associated with the technology.’ 24  The Committee took a pragmatic line, 
acknowledging the potential medical benefits of such technology and recommended 
that SCNT be permitted under licence, ‘to create and use human embryo clones for 
research, training and clinical application, including the production of human 
embryonic stem cells’.25 This being on the proviso that it will be illegal to implant the 
resulting embryos into the body of a woman, or to allow them to develop in vitro for 
more than fourteen days.26  
Consistent with this approach, the Report recommended that the definition of 
‘embryo’ be amended in both the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act and Research 
Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth) to include an embryo created by 
procedures other than fertilisation of an egg and sperm, such as via SCNT. It 
suggests that the starting phase of an embryo be defined at a later stage than is 
currently provided for in the legislation. The current definition sets out that the 
starting point is the appearance of two pro-nuclei.27 The Committee considered that 
syngamy was a better starting point because they noted that ‘it is at this stage, 
when the maternal and paternal chromosomes align, that a new genetic entity is 
formed.’ However, it concluded that because the precise point of syngamy is difficult 
to observe, the definition should refer to the first cell division.  
It was suggested that the legislative definition of human embryo be amended 
to the following: 
A human embryo is a discrete living entity that has a human genome or an 
altered human genome and that has arisen from either: 
1. the first mitotic cell division when fertilisation of a human oocyte by a 
human sperm is complete; or 
2. any other process that initiates organised development of a biological entity 
with a human nuclear genome or altered human nuclear genome that has 
the potential to develop up to, or beyond, 14 days and has not yet reached 
eight weeks of development.’28 
 
The Committee were of the view that a range of scientific practices should also 
be permitted to create human embryos, other than by fertilisation. It was of the view 
that all nuclear and pronuclear transfer methods (including transfer of stem cell 
nuclei) should be permitted, under license. It also suggested that parthenogenetic 
activation of oocytes should be permitted to allow oocyte maturation research. 
Further recommendations were that the creation of embryos using the genetic 
material from more that two people, and the creation using precursor cells from a 
human embryo or foetus, should also be legalised.29   
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA) recently issued a licence to a research team at the University of Newcastle-
upon-Tyne to use the SCNT process to conduct research into a mitochondrial 
disorder, muscular dystrophy. In order to undertake this research the team were 
authorised to create a human embryo via SCNT containing the genetic material of 
three people. Such a procedure would currently be unlawful in Australia due to the 
prohibition on creating or developing embryos with the genetic material of more than 
two people. 30  However, if the Lockhart recommendations are now implemented, 
such a procedure would become legal.31
 
The Report does not envisage that the current two-step process of HREC, then 
NHMRC Embryo Research Licensing Committee, approval would change. However, 
the Review Committee suggested that the powers of the Licensing Committee should 
be expanded to enable it to consider license applications which fit within the newly 
legalised research practices. The Licensing Committee would continue to have a 
 3  
monitoring and compliance function. It also envisaged that the Licensing Committee 
would have increased discretion to consider research proposals which do not fit 
squarely within the legislative guidelines, in order that constant amendments do not 
need to be made to keep pace with scientific advances.32  Recommendations 50 to 
53 of the Report set out that the Licensing Committee should also be authorised to 
give binding rulings and to grant licenses on the basis of those rulings on the 
interpretation of legislation, provided that it would report immediately to the 
NHMRC and to Commonwealth Parliament on such rulings. 
The Review Committee also believed that a national stem cell bank would be 
the most effective way to enhance research, in particular, to provide scientists with 
effective access to a variety of stem cell lines and to improve quality control.  It was 
considered that the Australian Stem Cell Centre could be expanded to accommodate 
such a stem cell bank.33
The recommendations of the Lockhart Review Report are considered by many 
to be extremely controversial. The moral status of a preimplantation embryo was the 
pivotal issue in many of the submissions made to the Review Committee and in 
much of the post-Report debate. It is therefore timely to examine the various ethical 
positions that were presented to the Committee, and to analyse the approach that 
the Review Committee took to this important issue. 
 
The moral status of a human preimplantation embryo 
The Review Committee identified that there were three different ethical 
positions that underpinned the submissions made. These positions echoed those 
identified in a report published by a United Kingdom, House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee in 2005.34 They were: 
1. That the embryo is human life and is therefore entitled to conferral of full 
human rights, including the right to life, and should not be subject to 
destructive research under any circumstances 
2. That the development of personhood is a gradual process but that the 
embryo is entitled to some protection; embryos should be subject to 
research in certain appropriate circumstances, such as when they are 
excess to ART needs, nonviable or unsuitable for implantation  
3. That the embryo is no more than a collection of cells, it may have the 
potential to develop into a human being, however the embryo entity should 
be used in medical research due to its potential to provide benefit to 
medicine and science and the treatment of disease.35  
The Review Committee observed that, in general, position (a) was often held by 
community interest and religious groups and position (c) by scientists, however, that 
this was not always the case and that there were many different views put forward.36 
Important contexts which the Review Committee used to analyse the submissions 
were: the intended use of the embryo, the method of creation, social relationships and 
the status of a human embryo.  
In relation to the intended use of the embryo, some submissions argued that an 
embryo created for a couple intending to have a child and implanted in a woman’s 
uterus should have a higher moral status than an embryo created purely for research 
purposes. Proponents of this argument contended that the moral significance of an 
embryo created by SCNT was linked to its potential through research to assist in the 
development of medical treatments, rather than to its potential for human life. One 
submission argued that ‘If the law said that SCNT embryos cannot be implanted, then 
they would not be a potential human being but ‘just a bunch of cells’.37 Others argued 
that the intended use of an embryo has no relevance to the embryo’s status.38  
In relation to the method of creation, some submissions contended that social 
relationships distinguished embryos formed for the purpose of family creation from 
embryos created for research purposes. These submissions argued that the family 
connections of embryos formed for ART purposes are what defines them as human 
beings.39 Others did not agree with such distinctions stating that embryos, no matter 
what their social context, had the clear potential to develop into human beings.40
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The Review Committee astutely chose not to clearly support a particular moral 
position in the debate about the ethical status of a preimplantation embryo. The 
Report does reveal that the Review Committee found it ‘difficult to logically define a 
moral difference between embryos formed by fertilisation and those formed by 
nuclear transfer or related methods.’41  However, the Review Committee accepted 
that embryos formed by ART for the purpose of family creation had a greater social 
or relational significance than embryos formed by nuclear transfer.42
It could be argued that the Review Committee adopted an approach between 
positions two and three in relation to the moral status of a preimplantation embryo. 
The Committee considered that the entity created through SCNT is a human embryo 
and given the right conditions, has the potential to develop into a human being.43 It 
was therefore not of the view that it was merely ‘a collection of cells’. However, it 
accepted arguments that ‘the moral significance of cloned embryos that are not 
implanted is linked more closely to their potential for research developments, 
including the development of treatments for serious medical conditions, than to 
their potential as a human life.’44  
This position is consistent with existing policies in Australia revealing how the 
preimplantation embryo is valued in our society.45 Excess ART embryos can only be 
stored for a maximum of ten years, and then will be removed from storage and 
disposed of if not donated to research or to another couple.46 Embryos rejected in 
the preimplantation genetic diagnosis process will also be disposed of.  
In general, Australian law does not consider developing humans to have the 
same rights and protections as children or adults. A foetus has generally been held 
to have no legal personality47 until it is born and has a separate existence from its 
mother.48 It therefore does not have an entitlement to human rights such as the 
right to life and bodily integrity. Although abortion is technically illegal in a number 
of Australian states,49 it has been held that it is not unlawful when the person 
performing the procedure had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to avert 
serious danger to the mother’s physical or mental health.50 The mother’s interests 
therefore prevail over the rights of her unborn child. The NHMRC Ethical Guidelines 
state that ART embryos are not to be treated as ‘mere tissue’,51 however, as the 
creation of embryos through SCNT is currently illegal, there is nothing presently in 
legislation to indicate what their moral position may be if they were made legal.  
Some would argue that preimplantion embryos are ‘potential life’, however, if 
they are created for the purposes of destructive research and never intended to be 
implanted, it is arguable that they do not even possess the potential for life. The 
Review Committee’s recommendations that SCNT be legalised, seems to indicate the 
view that the nuclear transfer embryo has no rights other than in the context of its 
use in medical research, being the purpose for its creation. 
Although the Review Committee’s position on the ethical status of human 
preimplantation embryos may be considered to be inconclusive, there were many 
ethical arguments presented to the Committee in support of and against the creation 
and destruction of embryos for research purposes. The Report makes much clearer 
recommendations in relation to these issues.  
 
Ethical arguments presented for and against the creation and 
destruction of SCNT embryos for research purposes 
The primary argument presented in the Lockhart submissions against nuclear 
transfer was that it is unethical to create human embryos solely for the purpose of 
destroying them to extract stem cells, and that such practice conflicts with concepts 
such as the dignity of the individual. 52  This argument was premised on the 
perception that a SCNT embryo is ‘human life’, that life begins at the time of 
fertilisation and should be protected by our society from the moment it comes into 
existence.53 For others it was underpinned by the belief that a human embryo is 
‘potential life’ and has the potential to develop into a human being. 54   Another 
contention was that to permit embryos to be created and used for research purposes 
treats them as a product, a position that was described as ‘the commoditisation of 
unborn life.’55  
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However, the Review Committee rationalised that it could not see a discernable 
difference between what was currently occurring with the destruction of excess ART 
embryos for research and the same practices occurring in the future in relation to 
SCNT embryos.56 The Committee was of the belief that to permit one practice and 
not the other would be inconsistent, and would ‘appear to attach more importance 
to the treatment of infertility than to the treatment of other diseases and 
conditions’ 57  that could be assisted by research on embryos created by nuclear 
transfer. 
Another major objection to proceeding down the SCNT path was that it would 
inevitably lead to the practice of human reproductive cloning. 58  This has been 
termed the ‘slippery slope’ argument.59 It was considered that as therapeutic and 
reproductive cloning are based on the same technology, the use of one would 
inevitably lead to the utilisation of the other.60 In contrast, another submission was 
of the view that it was the intention behind each practice which clearly distinguished 
them from each other, therapeutic cloning being for the purpose of creating a stem 
cell line, and reproductive cloning occurring to create a human being.61 The Review 
Committee accepted that Australian scientists have no intention of engaging in 
reproductive cloning.62 The Committee was further convinced that strict legislative 
guidelines prohibiting reproductive cloning would reassure the Australian 
community that the practice of reproductive cloning would not occur.63  
A further concern was that the creation of stem cell lines requires a steady 
supply of human oocytes, and that such demand could lead to the exploitation of 
women, particularly women of low socio-economic means, if financial incentives 
were offered for egg donation.64 There were also concerns that egg donation requires 
invasive retrieval methods.65 The recent controversy in South Korea where female 
researchers were found to be donating their own eggs was cited in support. 66  
However, one submission suggested that egg donation could proceed in a similar 
fashion to that of the current system of organ donation. For example, a woman 
suffering from a severe disease who needed to utilise a stem cell therapy could use 
her own eggs for this purpose. For males, and for females unable to produce viable 
eggs, a family member, friend or stranger could consent to the donation of their eggs 
to the patient in question.67
The Review Committee accepted that there were ethical concerns with egg 
donation, as the donor would receive no direct medical benefit but would be exposed 
to possible medical risks. In response, the Committee recommended that the 
NHMRC develop strict guidelines regulating egg donation, and that donors be 
required to give free and informed consent. The committee was of the view that 
donors should not be paid for their services, but that they should be reimbursed for 
reasonable expenses.68 The Report also recommended that there be a clear divide 
between ART treatment and donation for SCNT, so that women involved in fertility 
treatment are not coerced into producing excess eggs. 69  The Committee also 
suggested that further research be directed at identifying alternative egg sources.70 
To assist in ensuring a supply of oocytes, the Committee recommended that human 
nuclear transfer into animal egg cytoplasm should be permitted.71
Another contention was that the creation of embryos via SCNT is unnecessary, 
as research on adult stem cells can achieve the same or better results. 72  
Submissions along these lines argued that if medical therapies can be developed 
from adult stem cells, it is unethical to create and destroy embryos by nuclear 
transfer.  It was pointed out that adult stem cells can also be derived from the 
patient, avoiding any problem of rejection when reintroduced into the patient’s body. 
To add weight to these contentions, it was argued that while successful stem cell 
therapies have been developed from adult stem cells, to date, no such therapies, 
have yet been fully developed from embryonic stem cells.73   
The alternative viewpoint presented was that it is too early to determine 
whether adult stem cell research will be capable of developing therapies to treat 
some afflictions, such as spinal cord injuries, and that scientists should have access 
to both types of research in order to fully develop the range of possible medical 
therapies.74 The Review Committee accepted the view that adult stem cell therapies  
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may have less potential than embryonic stem cell therapies and that both forms of 
research should proceed so that stem cell research can reach its fullest potential.75
The primary position presented to the Review Committee in support of nuclear 
transfer was that human preimplantation embryos should be used in biomedical 
research due to the great potential that they have to benefit science and the 
development of medical therapies. Submissions in support of this view argued that a 
nuclear transfer embryo is not ‘human life’ and some argued it was not even 
‘potential life’. Some submissions contended that SCNT embryos are never intended 
to be transferred to a woman’s uterus and, as the requisite next step of implantation 
will not be carried out, they do not have the potential to develop into a human 
being.76 One submission argued that there should be different classes of embryos 
based on the method of creation, and that ‘Cells that are to be studied entirely in 
vitro in a research context, and are not formed from a fertilised embryo, should not 
be regarded as embryos [...]’77 Consistent with this approach, it has been previously 
argued that for an embryo to be regarded as a human life or as an entity with 
interests, it must possess ‘a nervous system capable of sentience, if not also of 
cognition and consciousness.’78
Another submission contended that the destruction of an embryo for research 
purposes can be justified if it takes place ‘when a greater benefit will result.’ 79  
Another reasoned that as a preimplantation embryo has no right to life, there is no 
moral justification needed to create embryos for research. This submission further 
argued that it was only the scientific point of the research which required 
justification.80 An alternate perspective was that ‘It is difficult to see how an embryo 
created and destroyed for research purposes can be considered to have been 
harmed, it is no worse position than if it had not been brought into existence in the 
first place.’81
However, the potential for stem cell research to lead to medical therapies that 
may assist a wide range of diseases, was the overriding theme.82 Many submissions 
were received from Australians suffering from diseases such as diabetes, spinal 
injuries, Parkinson’s disease and motor neurone disease. The majority of these 
people viewed stem cell research in the context of having the potential to ease their 
suffering.83  
Other submissions detailed the developments made in stem cell research, 
revealing, for example, that research performed on animals has shown some 
promise that stem cell therapies have the potential to improve the function of spinal 
cord injury patients.84 In the United Kingdom, a research team is studying motor 
neurone disease using SCNT.85 A submission from the Diabetes Transplant Unit 
indicated that if nuclear transfer was legalised in Australia, the unit would apply for 
a licence to create stem cell lines that could be used as models for studying Type 1 
diabetes.86  
However, some submissions questioned whether stem cells created via SCNT 
will ever achieve the potential of therapeutic applications, as the fact that stem cells 
therapies are ‘custom-made’ for the patient may subsequently ensure that the cost 
of such therapy becomes prohibitive.87 In response, it was argued that stem cells 
derived from SCNT can initially be used as valuable tools in studying certain 
diseases. This can enable scientists to study the way that a disease in question 
progresses and potentially how to prevent or treat it. 88  It is also clear that the 
technology can be used in the screening of new drugs.89
The Report certainly canvasses the concern that it may be up to ten years 
before current stem cell research is transformed into viable medical therapies.90 In 
this regard there were conflicting ethical positions put forward. One argument was 
that there was not enough evidence that stem cell therapies would be successful, 
and consequently, that Australia should only lift the current ban on nuclear transfer 
when there is clear evidence of successful therapies.91 An alternative viewpoint, and 
one that was embraced by the Committee, was that the ethical starting point should 
be: why should Australia not be supporting this research? The contention being that 
if such research may have the potential to save lives, it should be allowed to occur 
immediately as ‘if we cause a delay in this research, we may thereby be responsible 
for the premature deaths of many people.’92 The Review Committee concluded that 
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the further development of embryonic stem cell research requires the creation of 
SCNT embryos which are custom-made to develop specific cellular therapies, or to 
provide modelling for various diseases.93
A further ethical issue raised in other forums, is that if Australia now 
continues with its ban on nuclear transfer based on a policy position that the 
practice is unethical, should Australians be permitted to benefit if medical therapies 
are successfully developed overseas?94 Should a benefit be extracted from an alleged 
moral wrong? The contention being that Australians should not benefit from 
practices which are considered unethical. However, it would then follow that many 
people may not be able to utilise medical therapies that would give them increased 
quality and length of life. This issue was also raised in the Review, with the possible 
beneficiaries of stem cell therapies acknowledging the enormous benefit that stem 
cell therapies may have for hundreds of thousands of Australians.95
The philosophical theory of utilitarianism lends support to the argument in 
favour of the SCNT process being made legal. This theory ‘resolves a conflict of 
individual interests in the manner which serves the greater aggregate interest.’96 
Accordingly, whether the destruction of a human embryo for the purposes of 
research is morally right or wrong turns on whether such destruction facilitates 
research that is overwhelmingly for the common good.97 Many submissions echoed 
this theme. For example, Stem Cell Ethics Australia contended that: 
Public benefit is the paramount standard for the conduct of science. Where 
particular professional, individual, institutional, or commercial considerations 
conflict with public benefit, then public benefit must prevail.98
 
The Review Committee’s final recommendations firmly supported this line of 
reasoning. The Committee was of the view that the greater the potential benefits of 
an activity such as embryo research, the greater need for ethical objections to be at 
a high level, and widely held, to justify preventing such research. It stated that, just 
because some sectors of the community object to a practice, does not mean that 
such a practice should be rendered illegal.99 In coming to the conclusion that SCNT 
and other procedures to create embryos should be made legal, the Committee noted 
that it was impossible to reconcile the various views held by different sectors of 
Australian society as to the moral status of an embryo. However, it was clear that 
the majority supported medical research aimed at assisting infertile couples to have 
children and to prevent or cure serious disease. The Review Committee stated, ‘the 
social and moral value that some communities attach to the human embryo needs 
to be balanced against the social and moral value that other communities attach to 
the treatment of disease and to helping people to have a family’.100 The Committee 
rationalised that, although community surveys displayed widespread disapproval for 
reproductive cloning, the majority of Australians thought embryonic stem cell 
research was useful and acceptable and were in favour of using such research to 
assist with the treatment of disease.101
 
The way forward 
The countless submissions made to the Lockhart Review highlight that 
Australia is a pluralistic society, and that there are many complex ethical issues 
relevant to the debate about the creation and destruction of SCNT embryos for 
medical research. There were numerous submissions to the Lockhart Review from 
various sectors of the community, both organisations and individuals, who remained 
extremely concerned that the creation and destruction of human embryos in the 
name of research is clearly unethical and a violation of the sanctity of human life. In 
contrast, many submissions, particularly from the scientific community and from 
those coping with serious disease, highlighted the gradual progress being made in 
embryonic stem cell research that continues to give hope to people suffering from 
serious afflictions that stem cell therapies may be able to improve their quality of 
life.  
The Review Committee diplomatically acknowledged that there was a diversity 
of opinion in Australia in relation to the moral status of a preimplantation embryo. 
The Committee accepted that such disparate views cannot be reconciled and that 
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disagreement will remain regardless of its recommendations. It therefore looked to a 
common concern and found this in ‘broad community support for medical research 
aimed at understanding, preventing or treating disease, and for research and clinical 
practice aimed at assisting people to have children (including general acceptance 
that this process may involve the ‘wastage’ of some embryos)’102  
In recommending that SCNT be permitted, the Review Committee took a 
utilitarian approach and placed the benefits that can be brought to medical research 
through stem cell research, above the ethical concerns of some sectors of the 
community.  This approach, which resolves a conflict of interest in favour of the 
course that will benefit the common good, should be adopted, as has been the case 
in the United Kingdom. Although medical science has yet to develop a successful 
stem cell therapy from embryonic stem cells, there are indications that such 
therapies may be available in the next five to ten years.103
This approach is also consistent with the legal and moral status of an SCNT 
embryo. Australian society already accepts the destruction of excess ART embryos at 
the end of their storage period and when donated to medical research. It also 
accepts the destruction of unsuitable embryos rejected through the pre-implantation 
diagnosis process. It is only a small step forward for our society to now embrace the 
creation and destruction of nuclear transfer embryos for research purposes. It is 
clear that such an entity has a limited legal status, and does not possess human 
rights such as the right to life. It is also argued that its moral significance arises 
purely in the context of its purpose for creation, being medical research. Australian 
scientists have indicated that they have no intention of utilising the technology for 
reproductive cloning, so such objections to the legalisation of nuclear transfer are 
unjustified.104  
It is now for Commonwealth Parliament to decide on legislative reform to show 
the way forward for Australia. It is argued that the approach of legislators should be 
one that was argued before the Review Committee - that is, why should Australia 
not be supporting stem cell research? If such research may have the potential to 
save or improve the quality of many lives, it should be legalised as soon as possible 
due to the overwhelming concern that ‘if we cause a delay in this research, we may 
thereby be responsible for the premature deaths of many people.’105  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1   The then Minister for Ageing, the Hon. Julie Bishop MP, had portfolio responsibility for human 
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